Philippine Party-List System: A Failure or a Success? Essay

The coun causes population is ab go forth 90 million ab out 70 portionage of which is in poverty. It is non farfetched to say that majority of the unsophisticateds population is under sufficed and marginalized our farmers, fisher folks, the youth and the women among originator(a)s and are in need of semipolitical relations attention. In a developing rural area handle the Filipinos, decision-making or policy-making must gear towards development of these underserved firmaments of the Philippine companionship. The population elects its legislators sexual intercourseional and call(a)er-list redeatives, senators and the rest of the elective appendages of the bureaucracy. only what assurance do the Filipino muckle provoke that the underserved are equal in the policy-making body of the country? It is the fellowship-list organization. As defined by Republic Act No. 7941 overly k nowadaysn as the Philippine companionship-list Act, the departmenty-list formation i s a mechanism of proportionate copy in the pick of nameatives to the hearth of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions at that placeof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).The rationale behind the emergence of the Philippine party-list dodging in the Philippine party authorities is to provide representation to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of the society a democratizing agent to the elite-oriented Congress. N unrivalledtheless(prenominal), it attempts to challenge the status quo and truly serve the underserved battalion (Rivera, 2007). The emergence of the party-list musical arrangement is non an change surfacet which transpired out of the drab rather an attempt to redress an insufficiently undemocratic growing elite party politics in the country. Tracing history backwards, the domination of the elite-oriented party politics lowlife clearly be seen since its beginning up to its mov e ascendancy in the Philippine politics enjoinly. When the Ameri muckle rule in the Philippines instigated, they were faced with Filipino armed resistance. To resist such insurgencies and to install its bonk control over the Philippines, the Americans painstakingly deceived the Filipinos thru the Filipinization it proposed a venue for Filipino enfolding in the realm of governance and politics. To achieve such purpose, they recruited the elites to join the Filipinization (Gealogo, 2007). wherefore the elites?For one, they read their own s deliberate to shelter. They have much and more to lag than to gain if they wont yield and collaborate with the colonizers. And they do non trust their fellow Filipinos for they themselves have branded their fellowmen as thieves. Simply put, they try to maintain political power. And political power resides in property in their wealth. It is meshinging to note, they have collaborated not with the Americans restorely just with all the ot her colonizers who came to our land and they successfully maintained a stronghold in the political arena in the arena of influence and the influential and so begins the triumph of the elites. Dante Simbulan (2005) sites that the political parties or factions that developed today had one common beginning the principalia mathematical sort which . . . was composed of the native public opinion elites under the Spaniards emphasis added. The elites of today are in fact the elites of the colonial Philippines. Surprisingly, the completed Philippine party system in todays time is dominated only by less than a hundred to a hundred blind drunk families, and they exist as political clans and dynasties (Simbulan, R., 2007).Does one expect an elite-oriented Congress to legis young against its own interests and sincerely serve the great masses the marginalized and the underrepresented? Prior to the party-list system, minority parties that represent the interest of the same sectors that the party-lists represent today have existed. They tried to forward the interest of the underserved and the marginalized, but eventually, no working class (or counter elite) political group or party was able to prosper emphasis added (Simbulan, D., 2005). Former minority parties did not thrive. Now that the Philippine Party-list Act provides the establishment of the party-list system, the question is Will it, too, pilot like the minority parties which use to assume the same role it does today? This paper seeks to tax the efficacy of the party-list system while pointing out loopholes and lapses in the system.As Section 2 of Republic Act No 7941 or the Party-list System Act states, the Party-list System has three basic elements (1) to include the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of the country in the legislative processes of the House of Representatives democratize the Congress (2) to pluralize the party system by encouraging multi-parties and (3) to simplify the electoral system. Let us get a line the rootage element of the party-list system by finding out whether it complies with its virtually basic purpose or not that is to democratize the Congress. Based on RA 7941 and the 1987 Constitution, the party-list (originally) has the following basic features 1. Twenty share allocation. The party-list representatives constitute 20% of the come in number of representatives including those under the party-list.2. Two percentageage limen. A party or organization must obtain at least two percent of the heart and soul votes obtained by the party-list system in order to get one stern. 3. Three- idler limit. Section 11 of RA 7941 specifies that a qualified party would be authorise to a maximum of three sit down. 4. Proportional representation. The supererogatory place that the party is entitled to are computed in proportion to its total number of votes. Over the years, thither have been debates on these basic features of the party-list system t he body structure per se is said to be a counter-productive structure and is in contrast to the really purpose of the party-list system. To show this, let us take a look at the 14 years of the party-list system. The premiere forever party-list choice in 1998 was accepted with enthusiasm. A total of 123 parties participated in the alternative.The first party-list election was not free of controversies. Right aft(prenominal) the election, a authoritative party-list (PAG-ASA) filed a petition wanting the filling up of the complete 20 percent membership of the party-list to the House of Representatives they argued it is mandatory. This petition gathered support from ennead other organizations which in like manner filed. Eventually, the COMELEC declared all the other 38 organizations in addition to the already declared 14 winners. In declaring the other 38 organizations the COMELEC clearly disregarded the 2 percent threshold and it reasoned out that their decision was based on the following justifications (1) the marginalized and the underrepresented sectors must be represented in the House of Representatives, (2) the party-list system must represent the broadest sectors of the society and (3) it would progress multi-party system.However, 12 of the parties which were initially declared by the COMELEC objected to the proclamation of the other 38 organizations arguing that only them (the 14 initially declared winners) are entitled to the seat in the lower house because the other 38 organizations failed to impress the 2 percent vote threshold.Eventually, the dispute was resolved in the exacting speak to. In an en banc session of the Supreme Court in October 1998 it control that the 20 percent seat allocation as prescribed by Section 5 (2) of the Constitution is not mandatory. Furthermore, it ruled that the 2 percent threshold is constitutional thus required to obtain a seat in the House of Representatives. So the COMELEC had to recall the proclamation of t he other 38 organizations. Given the basic features of the party-list system, one important question needs to be answered How does the party-list system enhance the chances of marginalized or underrepresented parties of winning seats in the House of Representatives? The COMELEC says that with the three- seat cap for the party-lists, major political parties or the bigger parties which commonly dominates the elections leave not have the chance to corner all the seats in the House of Representatives and crowd out minority parties. This, they argue, will throw out the party-lists to win seat in the House of Representatives.Granted this to be genuine and the desired or expected consequence to be existent, the party-list is indeed a potential counter-foil to the elite-dominated Congress. However, accustomed over over this features, specially the three-seat cap, Felix Muga (2007c) arguesin contrast with what the COMELEC declaresthat this features of the party-list system particularl y the three-seat cap is a counter-productive structure for it promotes the break-up of a strong party into littler ones and discourages parties to form bigger coalitions (Para. 4). To beautify this, let us consider the events after the 2001 Party-list Elections. After the Supreme Court disqualified some parties during the 2001 Elections, Bayan Munas fortune share of total party-list votes reached 26.82 percent (Party-List Canvass Report outcome 26 as September 7, 2001). Sadly, they were just given three seats. Consequently, in the 2004 party-list election, Bayan Muna bust up into smaller parties and obtained 6 seats in the House of Representatives. utterance that not only Bayan Muna resorted to this break up there are as well several of other party-lists like the Sanlakas. Thus, Muga further claims that it 3-seat cap does not pave the bearing for smaller parties to win seats in the House of Representatives. Together with the 2% informal threshold in the simplified Comelec Form ula or with the first party-rule of the Panganiban Formula, it cannot fill up the gettable number of party-list seats and causes the Formula used to contradict the principle of proportional representation emphasis added. The party-list as defined is a mechanism for proportional representation (RA 7941). Thus, for instance, if a party gets 50 percent of the total party-list votes, it shall get the 50 percent of the total number of seats allocated for the party-lists (principle of proportionality).RA 7941 requires a vote threshold. The two (2) percent vote threshold means that the party which obtained at least 2 percent of the party-list votes will be allotted the seat. Mathematically, this can be represented by total number of votes of all parties divided by the total number of available seats (Hare Quota). In the 2007 Party-list election, the total number of party-list votes reached 8,416,421 the 20 percent seat allocation for that particular Party-List Election translated to 55 se ats. Therefore, following the above-mentioned formula, we contract at 8,416,421 divided by 55 seats, equals 153,025 (Hare Quota).Following the principle of proportionality, we now compute the idol seat for BUHAY party-list, the top-notch party-list group in the 2007 Party-List Election. BUHAY attained a total number of votes of 1,169,234 we divide it with the Hare Quota for the 2007 Party-list Election computed earlier which is 153,025 (1,169,234/153,025). Thus, the ideal seat for BUHAY is 7.64.However, the ideal seat is not the actual seat given to the winning party-list groups. Muga (2005) came up with the idea of seat allocation error to illustrate the difference between the ideal seat and the actual seat given (ideal seat actual seat given). BUHAY party-lists ideal seat is 7.64, but it was granted with only 3 seats. Thus, the seat allocation error is 4.64 seats. They were strip of 4 more seats in the Congress and were only given 3. Muga also provided a formula in computing t he disenfranchised votes which can be expressed as Degree of Negation X Hare Quota = Number of votes disenfranchisedTo a certain extent, the basic features the three-seat cap, the 2 percent vote threshold and the First Party Rule of the party-list systems structure caused the negation of proportional representation. This structure is indeed counter-productive on the part of the party-lists and most of all, the entire marginalized sector they represent. The party-list system seeks to democratize the Congress. Ironically, the structure itself does not provide whatever clear means for a genuine democratization of the Congress. Given this restrictions, no party can really grow in the Congress. In the last mentioned part of this paper, performance of the party-lists (in terms of edict) shall be assessed and we will found out if the current party-list structure has something to do with the party-lists performance. Also, major concerns of the party-list system are issues on accredita tion, membership and legislation. The accreditation process employed by the Commission on Elections is very loose there is leave out of prohibition against party-lists with links to the government (irrespective whether direct or indirect), lack of strict imposition of prohibition on party-lists receiving remote support, lack of strictness in following the rules set by the law on who shall become the party-lists nominee among others.To illustrate this, let us consider the party-list Aksyon Sambayanan or AKSA. It is very clear in the Supreme Court vox populi that a party-list shall be disqualified if It is receiving foreign support from either foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members, or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc). Despite that, after cognize to be supported by Socia list International, AKSA still was accredited, allowed to join the election and was given seat in the House of Representatives (Manalansan, 2007). It may be proficient to say that the Supreme Court ruling has not been proven unclimbable because such lapses occur. Also is the nominee Catalina Bagasina a provincial board member and a business woman of the Pilipino Association for Country or urban Poor Youth Advancement Welfare (Pacyaw).The Ang Galing Pinoy party-list is a group representing the protective covering guards. Its representative to the Congress is the author first sonthe son of the former President now Pampanga Representative Gloria Arroyo Rep. Juan Miguel Mikey Arroyo. What is troubling somewhat this is that Rep. Arroyo is not and has never been a trade protection guard. In short, he doesnt depart to the sector he represents. Logically, how can he truly understand the plight of the security guards if he himself is not one of them? The Supreme Court ruling states that not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, so also must its nominees. The nominees must be Filipino citizen who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties he/she represents (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc, para. 8). Surprisingly, Ang Galing Pinoy which is in clear insubordination to this rule is still in position in Congress. Still surprisingly, there are other party-lists in defiance to this.1-UTAK party-list a group representing PUV drivers, operators and commuters had the late former Energy Secretary Angelo Reyes as its representative. It is interesting to note that former Sec. Reyes is a stalwart defender of the oil deregulation law, which this group he tried to represent, strongly opposes. Another point the Supreme Court ruling raised was that the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the ma rginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 or R.A. 7941 (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, En Banc). However, APEC or the Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives is not a marginalized group yet it is granted the chance to join the election and win seats. Manalansan (2007) further points out other party-lists which are not considered marginalized. They are BUHAY, Veterans Federation of the Philippines and Cooperative- national Confederation of Cooperatives (Coop-NATCCO) among others. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or entry funded or assisted by, the government. . . .The participation of the government or its official in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not only illegal and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law (Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 200 1, En Banc). However, the Veterans Federation of the Philippines (VFP) is a government-funded group. It is in fact a creation of R.A. 2640 (Manalansan, 2007). Clearly, there are lots of loopholes in the current party-list system not only the structure which makes it ineffective but also the very process of filtrating or accrediting the party-lists-to-be and the nominees. In its 14 years of existence, how well did the party-lists performed in the Philippine legislature? In the 11th Congress, the party-list representatives filed a total of 3, 698 bills and resolutions. Only 20 bills reached hour Reading. In the 12th and thirteenth Congress, party-lists representatives filed a total of 5, 706 bills and resolutions, but majority of which are still pending (Manalansan, 2007). In the 14th Congress, there were 19 bills which reached the Third Reading but disappointingly, none became a law.One may remember the approval of the 125 pesos daily minimum wage increase in the 13th Congress. I t was filed by Bayan Muna Rep. Crispin Beltran (12th Congress) and refilled by him again in the 13th Congress (this time as Anakpawis representative). It was approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate. However, it was later on recalled. At the brighter side, laws on Abolition of the Death Penalty, Protection to Children in Conflict with the Law, Anti-Trafficking in Persons, Anti-Violence against Women and Overseas Absentee Voting have been passed with party-list representatives as forwarders and/or consultants. The progressive party-list representatives are diligent enough to file and re-file bills and resolutions that would serve the greater mass. These are bills to amend the Labor Code, to repeal the Automatic Appropriations law, Mining Act, National Government shopping mall Land Utilization Act and Oil deregulation Act among others.On the contrary, a number of bills have been passed within a short period of deliberations only. These bills are alleged as Malacaang-c ertified legislations. Examples of this are the spread out Value Added Tax, Lateral Attrition Law and the infamous Anti-terrorism bill or the Human Security Act of 2007. Since the beginning of the party-list system there were assumptions that the party-list, originating from elite politics, shall only prolong elite politics in the country (Simbulan, 2007). or so believe that this is just a make-believe measure to make it come forward that the Philippine society is well-represented in the legislature. At this point, we will try to assess whether this assumption is true or not. It is a fact that the Philippine congress is a congress of the elite or the wealthy oligarchs of the nation. As a matter of fact, in a study conducted by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), it found out that 60 to 100 wealthy families (political clans) dominate and determine the entire Philippine legislature or politics (Simbulan, 2007). The PCIJ studied political clans from 2001 to 200 4 and found out that political parties in the country are really clan alliances.In a Congress like this dominated by tralatitious parties and wealthy political clans, where number matters what can the very few party-list representatives do to forward the interest of the masses when it conflicts with the elites? Proponents of the party-list system admit that the party-lists have been absorbed by the tralatitious parties in the Congress. In news article from GMA News TV on April 6, 2010, former Marikina Rep. Romeo Candazo one of the main authors of the RA 7941 said that majority of the party-list representatives have been co-opted by traditional politics. As such, it is very difficult for this minority party-list to resist the domination of these ruling elites. These political clans coalesce with other clans or political parties to uphold and protect the status quo and to maintain a stronghold on the legislature. This sufficiently explains wherefore the party-lists get co-opted by these traditional parties. Clearly, the party-list is to the disadvantage as compared to the traditional parties in the Congress. First, the party-list lacks the number or a stronghold in the Congress delinquent to the seat allocation restrictions of the Party-List System Act. Also, the party-list lacks the machinery during elections. The very low voters turnout on party-list election testifies to the ignorance of the people on this system.This may be attributed to the lack of machinery of the party-lists system. The party-lists lack the financial prowess to air political ads on televisions and other media of information. In a Pulse Asia Survey (March 27 to April 4, 2004), television is the leading base source of election-related information (71%), followed by radio at 20 percent and newspapers by 4 percent (Arao, 2007). As such, how would the people know about the party-list if these media of information is not maximized by the party-list? However, we cannot deny the fact that the party-list has two faces the adequate and the poor. Some party-list representatives are found at the bottom 10 percent poorest Representatives, but there are party-list representatives who are millionaires. In the 12th Congress, APEC representatives were all multi-millionaires. There are many other millionaire party-list representatives like Alagads Rodante Macoleto, AVEs Eulogio Magsaysay, and Coop-NATCCOs Guillermo Cua among others.Note that in the 13th Congress, the richest party-list representative was VFPs Gidaya with a net worth of 34.66 million pesos and the poorest was Anakpawis Rep. Rafael Mariano with a net worth of 18,000 pesos (Manalansan, 2007). It is not farfetched that one day the party-list is no longer of difference with the traditional parties in the Congress. What future awaits the Party-List System? Will it too vanish or survive the test of traditional politics? In conclusion, this paper does not undermine the potential of the party-list system for it has f orwarded a significant number of bills and resolutions since 1998 up to this present Congress. It is a clear sign that the party-lists system, somehow, is working in the Philippines. They have provided the underserved and the marginalized a voice in the congress. They tried to strike a dimension in an elite Congress. The party-list per se is a great chance for the masses to be represented. But it is undeniable that the party-list system is failing.It might just be a matter of less than a decade that the narrow bridle-path constitutionally reserved for the representation of marginal sectors in Congress be permanently closed by traditional politics (Tuazon, 2007). It is quite not hard to conclude that the Philippine party-list system is more of a misery than a success. First and for most, its goal to democratize the Philippine Congress is at the onset defeated for the structure itself limits the growth of this party-list groups in the Congress and even encouraged break ups among th e party-lists. Secondly, the issue of accreditation weakens the chance of the party-list system to genuinely match its promising purpose to serve the marginalized and the underrepresented sectors of the society. Moreover, the party-lists are co-opted by traditional politics. The party-list legislation has not resulted to any concrete law that would directly benefit the underserved sectors of the Philippine society. Nonetheless, the future for the party-list system is still bright despite such failures. As Dr. Florangel Rosario Braid of the Justice Cecilia Munoz Palma Foundation saidThose who argue that it the party-list system should be retained, and in fact strengthened, point to how it has been able to balance our elite democracy by providing representation to sectors which otherwise would have been excluded under our present political system. But how do we deal with blatant abuses like having individuals who had never been a part of the group that they are expected to represent ? . . . It is about time that the system should be examined by groups from various sectors of society emphasis added.The party-list system as the sole legal or constitutional means by which the underrepresented and the marginalized sectors of the Philippine society assert their rights and be part of the Philippine legislature, despite its failure, should be braced and strengthened so as to serve its purpose truly.